Board and auditor interlocks and voluntary disclosure in annual reports by Braam, G.J.M. & Borghans, L.
PDF hosted at the Radboud Repository of the Radboud University
Nijmegen
 
 
 
 
The following full text is a publisher's version.
 
 
For additional information about this publication click this link.
http://hdl.handle.net/2066/83270
 
 
 
Please be advised that this information was generated on 2017-12-06 and may be subject to
change.
NiCE Working Paper 10-111 
December 2010
Board and auditor interlocks and voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports
Geert Braam 
Lex Borghans
Nijmegen Center for Economics (NiCE) 
Institute for Management Research 
Radboud University Nijmegen
P.O. Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands 
http://www.ru.nl/nice/workingpapers
1
Abstract
This paper explores the role o f the interlock ties of the board of directors and the external 
auditors in facilitating cross-firm diffusion of voluntary disclosure practices. Using data from 
149 companies listed on the Dutch stock exchange, we investigated the relationship between a 
firm ’s voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial performance measures in its annual 
report and the incidence of disclosure of these performance indicators in annual reports of 
other companies to which the firm is related via the interlock ties of the executive and 
supervisory board members and its auditor. To cover a firm ’s financial and non-financial 
aspects of performance, we classified the incidence in the annual report of the different 
performance measurement items within the four Balanced Scorecard perspectives of Kaplan 
and Norton (1992 and 1996). Our results suggest that firms with board members who also sit 
on the boards of directors of other firms have a higher probability of voluntarily reporting 
similar financial and non-financial disclosures in their companies’ annual reports. The 
experience o f the CEO is relevant for information disclosure about customers, while members 
of the supervisory board, especially the chairman, seem to promote additional information 
about learning and growth. Finally, the experience of the auditor matters for disclosure of 
financial performance indicators in the annual report.
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Introduction
The concern that traditional financial reports do not adequately represent the multiple 
dimensions of corporate value today has resulted in a search for new financial metrics 
(Rappaport, 1998; Steward, 1999), and/or additional non-financial performance measures 
(Kaplan and Norton, 1992 and 1996; Sveiby, 1997). Associated with these developments has 
been a growing tendency for companies to voluntarily disclose financial and non-financial 
performance measures in their annual reports. However, it is unclear whether this information 
helps firms to gain competitive advantage and improve company performance. Performance 
disclosures over and above mandatory requirements may positively influence capital 
providers and other stakeholders in their resource allocation decisions, but may also 
potentially damage the firm, for instance if  they result in increased competition (proprietary 
costs) or additional regulation. To adequately respond to external expectations and pressures, 
a firm ’s board of directors may need information that advances their knowledge about the 
economic consequences of voluntary performance disclosure and its implications for the 
firm ’s legitimacy. The question arises as to which sources o f information help a firm to deal 
with uncertainty and constraint associated with their voluntary disclosure decisions.
In this paper we explore the role of the interlock ties of board members and external 
auditors in facilitating cross-firm diffusion of voluntary disclosure practices. Directors and 
auditors often work for several firms, which allows them  to bring experience from one firm to 
another (Conyon and Muldoon, 2006). We investigate the relationship between a firm ’s 
voluntary disclosure of performance measures in its annual report and the incidence of 
disclosure of these performance indicators in annual reports of other companies to which the 
firm is related via the interlock ties of the executive and supervisory board members and its 
auditor. The existence of board and auditor interlocks creates information exchange channels 
between organisations which can help firms to reduce uncertainties and share information 
about effective and acceptable corporate disclosure practices. From an informational 
perspective, these social networks are influential in corporate decision-making and control 
relative to other sources of information because of the trustworthy, credible and, 
consequently, persuasive nature o f the information they convey (Useem, 1984; Haunschild, 
1993; Davis, 1996; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Rogers, 
2003). The idea of this paper is to identify the cross-firm diffusion o f voluntary annual 
reporting practices using information from the interlocks of firm s’ boards of directors and 
their external auditors. W e applied this approach to companies in a small region, i.e. Dutch
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firms, since relatively small communities are characterised by a high degree of interlocking 
relationships ((Mizruchi, 1996; Carroll and Fennema, 2002; Heemskerk and Fennema, 2009). 
W e used cross-sectional data from 149 non-financial companies listed on the Dutch stock 
market in 2004 to identify interlocking directorates and auditors in a two-tier system, and to 
assess these firm s’ voluntary disclosure of performance measures in their annual reports. To 
cover a firm ’s financial and non-financial aspects of performance, we classified the incidence 
o f the different performance measurement items within the four Balanced Scorecard 
perspectives of Kaplan and Norton (1992 and 1996), i.e. financial, customer, internal business 
processes, and learning and growth.
Our results show that director and auditor interlocks mattered for voluntary disclosure. 
Experiences of board members with similar corporate disclosure decisions in other companies 
were related to a firm ’s incidence of disclosing financial and non-financial measures in the 
annual report. More specifically, our results suggest that the experience of the CEO was 
relevant for information disclosure about customers, while members of the supervisory board, 
especially the chairman, seemed to promote additional information about innovation. The 
experience of the chairman also mattered for the disclosure of information on internal 
business processes. Finally, the interlock ties of the external auditors increased the likelihood 
of disclosing information on financial aspects, while the experience of the members of the 
supervisory board, excluding its chairman, seemed to reduce this likelihood. These results 
suggest that companies tend to learn from and model their voluntary disclosure of financial 
and non-financial performance measures in the annual reports on the best annual reporting 
practices of organisations to which they are interconnected via their board and auditor 
interlocks
This study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, the literature on 
voluntary disclosure studies empirically to what extent voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
is related to corporate characteristics and other determinants. Findings have consistently 
shown a significant and positive association between corporate size and foreign listing status 
and the extent o f voluntary disclosure in annual reports (Cooke, 1989 and 1992; W allace et 
al., 1994; Hossain et al., 1994; Depoers, 2000; Raffournier, 2005; Boesso and Kumar, 2007). 
In addition, empirical studies show a positive association between board independence and 
voluntary disclosure in countries in which investor protection rights are high (Eng and Mak, 
2003; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007; García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 
2010). Moreover, executive and non-executive board members may have different incentives 
to voluntarily report different types of disclosure in their companies’ annual reports (Lim et
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al., 2007). This study adds to this literature by examining the association between board 
interlocks and the incidence of voluntary disclosure o f financial and non-financial 
performance measures in annual reports and the differences in the association between the 
interlock ties of executive and supervisory board members in a two-tier system and this 
voluntary disclosure.
Second, the literature on the measurement of voluntary disclosure in annual reports 
uses a variety of frameworks to measure voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial 
performance measures in published reports (Wallace et al., 1994; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; 
W atson et al., 2002). In the absence of a generally accepted model for classifying the financial 
and non-financial disclosure items, in this study we used the four measurement perspectives 
of the Balanced Scorecard described by Kaplan and Norton, i.e. 'financial', 'customer', 
'internal business', and 'learning and growth' (1992 and 1996) to assess the comprehensiveness 
of firms’ voluntary disclosure on financial and non-financial aspects of performance in their 
annual reports.
Third, in the literature on board interlocks, from a network perspective, board and 
auditor interlock ties to other firms are a form of social capital that provides access to 
information that flows through the network social networks in management (e.g. Mizruchi, 
1996; Borgatti and Foster, 2003). Board interlocks have been found to influence many 
organisational practices, including CEO compensation (Hallock, 1997; Geletkanycz, Boyd 
and Finkelstein, 2001), governance practices (Davis, 1991), mergers and acquisitions 
(Haunschild, 1993), organisational structures (Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 1993), ISO quality 
systems (Chua and Petty, 1999) and joint venture formation (Gulati and Westphal, 1999). 
This study contributes to this literature by exploring whether and how board and auditor 
interlock ties facilitate the inter-organisational diffusion of voluntary disclosure practices in 
annual reports.
Finally, in spite of the fact that interlock research mainly focuses on the effects of 
direct network ties, empirical evidence suggests that indirect network ties influence and 
constrain the effects of direct ties (Gulati and Westphal, 1999). In this paper we explore the 
role of the interlock ties of external auditors in facilitating cross-firm diffusion of voluntary 
disclosure practices. Literature suggests that the contents of annual reports are not only 
audited but also influenced by auditors (Wallace et al., 1994). Specifically, audit firms 
perceived as offering ‘high quality’ services may likely incite firms to disclose more 
information in annual reports (Firth, 1979; Hossain et al., 1994; Raffournier, 2005). However, 
empirical support for the relationship between audit firm size and the level of voluntary
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disclosure is inconclusive (Wallace et al., 1994; Ahmad and Courtis, 1999). This study adds 
to this literature by investigating the relationship between a firm ’s voluntary disclosure of 
performance measures in its annual report and the disclosure of financial performance 
indicators in annual reports of other companies to which the firm is related via its auditor.
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we review related literature 
and develop hypotheses regarding the relationship between board and auditor interlocks and 
voluntary disclosure o f financial and non-financial measures in annual reports. Next the 
research method is described, and the results are presented and discussed. Finally, we draw 
conclusions, discuss limitations of our study, and point out directions for further research.
Literature review and hypotheses development
There is growing agreement that traditional financial reports do not adequately represent the 
multiple dimensions of corporate value today. Organisations increasingly rely on intangibles 
and intellectual assets in their value creation process rather than on traditional production 
factors such as physical and financial capital. However, mandatory information disclosure on 
intangible assets in annual reports is limited.1 Nevertheless, agency, signalling and legitimacy 
theory suggest that organisations may have incentives to voluntarily disclose financial and 
non-financial performance information that is deemed relevant to the decision needs of capital 
providers and other stakeholders (Ahmad and Courtis, 1999; W atson et al., 2002). For 
instance, organisations that compete with each other for funds in capital markets may reveal 
financial and non-financial performance measures in their annual reports over and above 
those that are mandatory. Such disclosures may reduce uncertainty, thereby lowering the cost 
of capital. On the other hand, voluntary information disclosure may also potentially damage 
the firm, if  it were to result in increased competition or additional regulation (Wallace et al., 
1994; Meek et al., 1995; Verrechia, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001).
In uncertain and competitive environments, new institutional sociology suggests that 
organisations are more likely to imitate other organisations in their field that they perceive to
1 Traditional financial reports have to provide for the recognition and measurement of 
physical and financial capital, while the financial statements only have to report on 
intangibles such as brand equity, patents and goodwill when they meet stringent recognition 
criteria. However, it is not mandatory to report information about the valuation of a 
company’s intangible and intellectual assets, such customer relationships, employee 
competencies, new products and services, and responsive and effective internal processes.
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be more successful or legitimate (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991).2 
Driven by the need to gain organisational effectiveness and/or social legitimacy, organisations 
tend to learn and model themselves on other organisations (Oliver, 1991). As a consequence, 
processes o f inter-organisational imitation -  or mimetic isomorphism -  lead to cross-firm 
diffusion of innovative organisational practices and ideas making organisations more similar. 
This inter-organisational imitation should help to deal rationally with uncertainty and 
constraint. In addition, normative pressures and professional networks also lead to processes 
of mimetic isomorphism. DiMaggio and Powell (1991) propose that mimetic isomorphism 
may be affected through change agents like interlocking directorates and consultants.
An interlocking directorate occurs when a person affiliated with one organisation sits 
on the board of directors o f another organisation (Mizruchi, 1996). Interlock literature 
emphasises the role of board interlocks as an important source of inter-organisational 
information exchange about potentially effective innovative corporate practices (Useem, 
1984; Davis, 1996; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Borgatti and Foster, 2003; Rogers, 2003). 
Board interlocks provide opportunities to share strategic information and learn about 
innovations that might help to create sustainable competitive advantage (Geletkanycz and 
Hambrick, 1997; Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Gulati and Westphal, 1999; Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001). They enable board members to achieve a ‘business scan’ of latest business 
practices, observing innovative practices in other firms, and witnessing firsthand the 
consequences of those practices (Useem, 1984). Moreover, direct contact with an innovator 
may help to clarify whether and how a specific innovation might fit unique organisational 
needs and opportunities. Especially in uncertain environments, interlocks are important to 
reduce the uncertainty and risks associated with the innovation (Haunschild, 1993; Carpenter 
and Westphal, 2001). From an informational perspective, interlocks are considered as 
influential in corporate decision-making and control relative to other sources of information, 
because of the trustworthy, credible and, consequently, persuasive nature of the information 
they convey (Borgatti and Foster, 2003). For these reasons, network research in management 
suggests that interlocking directorates are key antecedents to consider when explaining the
2 DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) identify three mechanisms other than competition to 
explain why isomorphic organisational change occurs: coercive isomorphism that stems from 
political influence and the problem of legitimacy; mimetic isomorphism resulting from the 
standard response to uncertainty; and normative isomorphism associated with 
professionalism. These mechanisms are analytically distinguishable yet not necessarily 
empirical (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 150). This paper focuses on the influence of mimetic 
and normative processes.
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inter-organisational diffusion o f voluntary disclosure practices, i.e. copying best annual 
reporting practices. Given this, we proposed the following hypothesis:
H1: Voluntary disclosure o f  performance measures in a firm ’s annual report is positively 
related to voluntary disclosure o f  performance measures in annual reports o f  other 
companies to which the firm  is related via their board interlocks.
In empirical research on board interlocks, all interlock ties are generally treated as 
equal connections that facilitate the exchange o f information between firms (Gulati and 
Westphal, 1999). However, interlocks may not affect outcomes uniformly (e.g. Haunschild 
and Beckman, 1998; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Borgatti and Foster, 2003). In a two-tier 
structure, executive board members, who are responsible for the administration of the firm, 
may use their experience in other firms in different ways from the supervisory members, who 
are formally independent from management and have to oversee and advise the executive 
board on behalf o f the shareholders’ interests. As representatives of owners, the supervisory 
board members, and particularly the members of the audit committee, are charged with 
oversight of financial reporting and disclosure to monitor managers’ behavior and reduce the 
information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Consequently, they may have 
different incentives to voluntarily report financial and non-financial disclosure in their 
companies’ annual reports than executive board members (Lim et al., 2007).
Empirical studies show a positive association between board independence and 
voluntary disclosure in annual reports in countries in which investor protection rights are 
high, suggesting that the composition of the board affects voluntary disclosure in annual 
reports (Eng and Mak, 2003; Cheng and Courtenay, 2006; Lim et al., 2007; Li et al., 2008; 
García-Meca and Sánchez-Ballesta, 2010). Lim et al. (2007) suggest that boards composed of 
largely non-executive and independent directors provide more voluntary disclose of forward 
looking and strategic information in annual reports than inside directors to protect their 
reputation as experts in decision control and to reduce their exposure to litigation risk from 
managers’ poor management and from inside directors providing misleading information. 
Consistently, we expect that the heterogeneity among board members may also affect the 
extent to which they use their experience with voluntary reporting practices in other firms to 
convey information and influence corporate disclosure decisions. Hence:
H2: The positive correlation o f voluntary disclosure o f performance measures in a f ir m ’s 
annual report with the voluntary disclosure o f  performance measures in annual reports o f  
other companies to which the firm  is related via their board interlocks depends on the 
positions o f members on the board.
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Finally, interlock research focuses on the effects of direct network ties. However, empirical 
evidence suggests that indirect network ties -  or third-party ties -  can influence or condition 
the effects of direct ties on various organisational practices. As a consequence, modelling the 
influence of indirect network ties on a firm ’s decision-making can contribute to understanding 
the effects of interlocks (Gulati and Westphal, 1999). In this paper we examine the association 
between the interlock ties of the external auditors and voluntary disclosure of financial and 
non-financial performance measures in corporate annual reports. Auditors often work for 
several firms, which allow them to bring experience from one firm to another. They may thus 
use their experience with annual reporting practices in other firms to influence and constrain 
the company’s executive and supervisory board members’ decision-making processes on 
voluntary corporate annual disclosure, and help them to deal with related uncertainty. For 
normative reasons, their main focus will be on disclosure of information on the financial 
position, performance, and changes in the financial position of a reporting firm. Hence:
H3: Voluntary disclosure o f performance measures in a firm ’s annual report on its 
financial position, performance, and changes in financial position, is positively related to 
voluntary disclosure o f similar performance measures in annual reports o f other companies 
to which the firm  is related via their external auditor.
Research method 
Data
The data used in this paper were collected from different sources. First general firm data and 
information about the interlock ties of the boards of directors and the auditors were collected 
from Osiris and Amadeus. Osiris is a comprehensive database of listed companies, banks and 
insurance companies around the world covering more than 190 countries and containing 
information on over 57 thousand companies. The Amadeus database contains financial 
information on over 11 million public and private companies in 41 European countries. 
Second, data on disclosure of financial and non-financial performance measures in the 
companies’ annual reports were collected from Company.info. Company.info is a database 
that contains comprehensive information about more than 2 million public Dutch firms. Two 
independent raters with an accounting background used content analysis to analyse the 
information disclosed in the annual reports. Subsequently, these data were merged yielding a 
complete data set.
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W e used data from Dutch companies, since the Netherlands is a small country that is 
characterised by a high degree of interlocking relationships (Carroll and Fennema, 2002; 
Heemskerk and Fennema, 2009). An additional advantage of using companies from the same 
small country is that they have to meet the same institutional requirements, and face the same 
set o f environmental conditions. As a consequence, they are subject to similar coercive 
pressures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). The companies that we selected were publicly listed 
on the NYSE Euronext Amsterdam in 2004 with their headquarters in the Netherlands. The 
Netherlands is a small, internationally oriented country with a codified system of law and a 
strong equity market (Nobes, 1998). Nobes and Parker (1995) classify the Netherlands at the 
extreme of the classification structure, i.e. micro-based and influenced by business economics 
theory. At the same time, the Netherlands has a strong equity market with a relatively large 
number of multinational corporations (Nobes, 1998). In addition, Dutch financial reporting 
practices are relatively close to UK and USA accounting practices (Weetman and Gray, 1991; 
Camfferman and Cooke, 2002). Our sample comprised 149 Dutch companies. All these 
companies had a two-tier structure. Table 1, panel A presents the distribution of the sample 
firms across industry -  using the 2-digit SIC codes -  and size.
[Insert Table 1]
Measurement of variables
Dependent variables
To measure the incidence of voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial performance 
measures in the annual reports, we used an index of comprehensive disclosure. In the absence 
of a generally accepted model for classifying the financial and non-financial disclosure items 
Marston and Shrives, 1991; W allace et al., 1994; Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; W atson et al.,
2002), we used the four measurement perspectives o f the Balanced Scorecard described by 
Kaplan and Norton, i.e. 'financial', 'customer', 'internal business', and 'learning and growth' 
(1992 and 1996).3 This measurement framework aims to provide a comprehensive set of 
financial and non-financial information on a firm ’s performance. 'It includes financial 
measures that tell the results of actions already taken. And it complements the financial
3 Please note that many measurement frameworks use the same broad categories. For 
instance, the balanced scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1992 and 1996) and the intangible asset 
monitor (IAM) (Sveiby, 1997) both classify intangibles in three categories. The categories 
'external structure', 'internal structure' and 'competence of personnel' of the intangible asset 
monitor are closely related to the balanced scorecard perspectives 'customer', 'internal 
business', and 'learning and growth' (Petty and Guthrie, 2000).
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measures with operational measures on customer satisfaction, internal processes, and the 
organisation’s innovation and improvement activities' (Kaplan and Norton, 1992:71). We 
used 20, 17, 12 and 19 performance measurement items to cover these scorecard perspectives. 
The disclosure items were based on items used in earlier studies (Firth, 1979; Hossain et al., 
1994; Meek at al., 1995; Depoers, 2000; Guthrie, 2001; Olson and Slater, 2002; Maltz et al., 
2003; Eng and Mak, 2003; Guthrie et at., 2006; Lim et al., 2007; Boesso and Kumar, 2007; Li 
et al., 2008;). In addition, the list of items was restricted to items that were relevant for all 
sample firms, so as not to penalize firms for not disclosing any item (Cooke, 1989; W allace et 
al., 1994). Appendix A presents a full overview of the performance measurement items used. 
The items are classified per scorecard perspective.
The approach to scoring items was dichotomous in which an item scores 1 if disclosed 
and 0 if  not disclosed (Cooke, 1989, 1992). Using the Company.info database, two 
independent raters with an accounting background examined the entire contents of the 
corporate annual reports to assess the disclosure scores using both the quantitative and 
qualitative information. To control for subjectivity during these content analyses, in the event 
of differences in judgment between the raters, the best interpretation was discussed in a 
meeting of the raters and the authors of this paper. Subsequently, for each company we 
calculated a disclosure index for each measurement perspective. To compute these indices, 
the scores of the individual items in a specific scorecard perspective were added and divided 
by the maximum number of items. Consequently the scores ranged from 0 to 1. Subsequently, 
for each corporate annual report a disclosure index was calculated. This measure of the 
overall incidence of voluntary disclosure of performance measures in the annual report was 
calculated by dividing the sum score on the four separate disclosure perspectives by four. An 
issue of some importance was weighting of disclosure items. Consistent with prior research 
(Cooke, 1989, 1992; Camfferman and Cooke, 2002), we assumed that each disclosure item 
and each measurement perspective was equally valuable.
Independent variables
To identify the interlocking directorates we used the Osires database which provides the 
names of all board members in the sample firm, with their function within the firm. After 
correcting differences in spelling of the name of the same person, we matched each board 
member within a firm to all the other firms in which this person was also a board member 
(Davis, 1991; Haunschild, 1993; Palmer, Jennings and Zhou, 1993; Conyon and Muldoon, 
2006). Based on these relationships, we calculated the average and maximum disclosure
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scores on the performance measurement items on the four perspectives for each member in 
each of his/her related firms, thus excluding the focal firm. These numbers therefore indicated 
the average and highest outside experience of the board members with disclosure of financial 
and non-financial measures in annual reports of their related firms (e.g. Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001). Theories about the diffusion of information acknowledge that both a best 
example (i.e. the maximum) and the frequency o f observed use can influence others (Rogers,
2003).
To aggregate these outside experiences of all individual board members to figures at firm 
level, we clustered the functions of the board member into five categories: 1. CEO; 2. CFO; 3. 
other member of the executive board; 4. chairman of the supervisory board; and 5. other 
member of the supervisory board. Per firm, we assessed the average and maximum disclosure 
scores for all these categories. Subsequently, we computed the average or the maximum 
scores for board members in the executive board (1.-3.) versus members o f the supervisory 
board (4.-5.). Finally, we assessed the average and maximum experiences for the board of 
directors as a whole (1.-5.). We used a similar approach to measure the interlock disclosure 
scores related to a firm ’s external auditor.
Control variables
W e included the natural logarithm of total employees and/or total assets, and industry 
dummies as control variables. The natural logarithm of total employees or total assets was 
included to proxy for the size of the company. Agency, signalling and legitimacy theory 
suggests that larger companies have to provide more financial and non-financial information 
to meet the requirements and expectations of their interested parties than their smaller 
counterparts (Ahmed and Courtis, 1999; W atson et al., 2002). For larger firms the relative 
costs of extensive information collection are also smaller. The industry dummies were 
included to control for industry effects on corporate disclosure practices.
Analysis
Our hypotheses were tested using linear regression models. The regression models 
estimated the relationships between the incidence of disclosure of financial and non-financial 
measures in a firm ’s annual report and the disclosure of performance indicators in annual 
reports of other companies to which the firm is related via the interlock ties of the executive 
and supervisory board members and its auditor. Before explaining the results of the regression 
analysis, the model was tested for linearity, homoscedasticity, multicollinearity and normally
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distributed data. The scatter plots of the residuals show a random array of dots, indicating 
linearity and homoscedasticity. The variance inflation factor (VIF) was smaller than 2 for 
each of the variables in each of the regression models, which indicates the absence of 
multicollinearity. Finally, all variables were normally distributed. Table 2 presents the 
correlation between total scores on information disclosure and the sub scores in the specific 
measurement perspectives with and without correction for size effects. The correlations 
between the total disclosure score and the sub scores with and without correction for size 
effects ranged from 0.512 and 0.439 for the financial perspective to 0.846 and 0.830 for the 
learning and growth perspective, indicating acceptable internal levels of consistency.
[Insert Table 2]
Since a firm ’s board members or its external auditor do not always have interlocks, some 
data on the outside experience of the board members and the auditors with voluntary 
disclosure in annual reports o f related firms were missing. To eliminate potential biases 
caused by these missing variables, we used the dummy variable adjustment method or 
missing-indicator method (Allison, 2001). This method creates dummy variables to use all the 
information that is available about the missing data. To produce optimal estimates for the 
missing predictors in a regression analysis, the dummy variables are equal to 1 if the specific 
group of board members or the external auditor of the focal firm do not have interlocks, 
otherwise they are 0. The dummy coefficients indicate the effects of not having experience 
with disclosure of performance measures in related firms on a firm ’s corporate annual 
disclosure. In the same regression, the average and maximum interlock (sub) scores for the 
companies with interlocks in related firms indicate the outside experience of the board 
members and the auditors in their related firms with disclosure of performance measures in 
annual reports.
For reasons of robustness we performed similar regression analyses with different 
measures for the experience of board members who did have interlock ties, i.e. the maximum 
and average interlock scores. In most cases we report the results using the measure based on 
averages only, but in all cases the results for the maximum scores were quantitatively the 
same.
Results
Table 3, panel A and B report the results of the regression analyses for the hypothesized 
positive relationship between voluntary disclosure of performance measures in a firm ’s
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annual report and the voluntary disclosure of performance measures in annual reports of other 
companies to which the firm is related via their board interlocks. In Table 3, panel A we used 
the average scores on disclosure of performance indicators in related firms as the measures of 
the experience o f a firm ’s interlocking board members. Panel A, models 1-3 explained 21­
24% of the variation of the scores on information disclosure in the focal firms’ annual reports 
while using different control variables (model 1: adj. R2 = 0.24, F = 4.9, p.<0.01; model 2: 
adj. R2 = 0.21, F = 9.1, p.<0.01; model 3: adj. R2 = 0.21, F = 7.5, p.<0.01). Furthermore, as 
anticipated, the experience of board members with corporate information disclosure in other 
firms they are associated with consistently had a positive and significant relationship with 
disclosure of performance measures in the firm ’s annual report. The effects were strong 
(model 1-3: P = 0.34; P = 0.34; P = 0.35, p.<0.05 respectively). The impact of not having 
board interlock ties on disclosure of performance indicators in a firm ’s annual report was also 
significant, but this effect was relatively small (both model 1-3: P = 0.15, p.<0.01 
respectively). These results suggest that companies copy the best annual reporting practices of 
organisations to which they are related via their board interlocks, suggesting that interfirm 
network ties of board members positively facilitate cross-firm diffusion of disclosure of 
performance measures in annual reports. This provides support for H1.
In Table 3, panel B we tested the robustness of our results by performing the same 
regression analyses but using the maximum scores on voluntary disclosure of performance 
measures in related firms as the independent variables that reflect the experience of a firm ’s 
interlocking board members. A comparison of the results in panels A and B showed that the 
relationships between a firm ’s voluntary disclosure of performance measures in its annual 
report, and the average and maximum experiences of the board members with voluntary 
information disclosure in related firms were consistently positive and significant, and thus 
robust. In addition, and also for reasons of robustness, we performed similar regression 
analyses with different measures for company size and with and without controlling for 
industry effects. The results in panels A and B, models 1-3 showed no quantitative 
differences when different measures of size were used and industry effects were controlled for 
or not. In the remainder of this paper, in the Tables 4 -5  we report the average scores on 
disclosure of performance measures in related firms as the measures of the outside experience 
of the board members, while using the natural logarithm of total employees and industry 
dummies as control variables. Additional analysis showed that the results in the Tables 4-5  
would not be substantially different with other indictors for size and/or voluntary disclosure 
practices in other firms or without industry dummies.
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[Insert Table 3]
To further explore the findings o f Table 3, panel A, model 1, in Table 4 we also used 
the disclosure scores on the four measurement perspectives of the Balanced Scorecard as 
dependent variables. The additional analyses in Table 4 show strong and positive significant 
relationships between experience of board members with voluntary disclosure o f performance 
measures on the 'customer' and 'learning and growth' perspectives in the annual reports of 
related firms, and disclosure o f performance measures in these measurement perspectives in 
the focal firm ’s annual report (P = 0.271, p<0.10; P = 0.379, p<0.01 respectively). These 
findings show that firms with board members who also sit on the board of directors of other 
firms have a higher probability of voluntarily disclosing specific performance measures in 
annual reports than firms whose board members do not have interlocks. These results suggest 
that board members with interlock ties put more emphasis on disclosure of specific 
performance information than board members who do not have interlocks. The findings 
provide additional support for H1.
[Insert Table 4]
Table 5 reports the regression results to test whether the positive correlation of 
voluntary disclosure of financial and non-financial performance measures in a firm ’s annual 
report with the voluntary disclosure of performance indicators in annual reports of other 
companies to which the firm is related via their board interlocks depends on the positions of 
members on the board. In Table 5 we classified the positions o f a firm ’s board members into 
five categories, i.e. the CEO, the CFO, the other executive board members, chairman of the 
supervisory board and the other supervisory board members. The findings in Table 5 show 
that firms whose CEO and supervisory board members had interlock ties, had a higher 
likelihood of disclosing non-financial performance measures in specific measurement 
perspectives. That is, experience o f the CEO was relevant for information disclosure about 
customers (P = 0.42, p<0.05), whereas the chairman of the supervisory board seemed to 
promote additional information about learning and growth and internal business processes (P 
= 0.47, p<0.01; P = 0.31, p<0.10 respectively). Experience o f the other members o f the 
supervisory board also increased the likelihood of information being disclosed on the learning 
and growth perspective (P = 0.27, p<0.10). These findings suggest that some interlock ties 
may promote the voluntary disclosure of performance measures in specific measurement 
perspectives. However, experience of the other members of the supervisory board was 
negatively related to the provision o f information on financial aspects. Although this effect 
was small (P = -0.02, p<0.05), this finding suggests that interlock ties can also reduce the
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likelihood of disclosing performance indicators in specific measurement perspectives. Finally, 
no significant relationship was found between the board interlock ties o f the CFO and the 
other members of the executive board and specific disclosure of performance measures in the 
annual reports. These results suggest that the interlock ties of board members with different 
positions can have different effects on firms’ voluntary annual reporting practices. Some 
board members may use their experience in related firms in different ways from other board 
members to promote or reduce the likelihood of disclosing specific performance information. 
The findings therefore provided support for H2.
[Insert Table 5]
Tables 4 and 5 also show support for H3, which predicts a positive and significant 
relationship between the disclosure in a firm ’s annual report of performance measures in the 
financial perspective and the disclosure of performance measures about the economic position 
and performance in annual reports o f other companies to which the firm is related via their 
external auditor. The effects were strong (Table 4: P = 0.28, p.<0.05; Table 5: P = 0.26, 
p.<0.05). The impact of not having auditor network ties on disclosure in the firm s’ annual 
reports o f performance measures in the financial perspective was also significant, but this 
effect was relatively small (Table 4: P = 0.02, p.<0.05; Table 5: P = 0.02, p.<0.05). In 
addition, the results in Tables 4 and 5 show no significant relationships between voluntary 
disclosure of performance measures in the measurement perspectives 'customer', 'internal 
business' and 'learning and growth' in a firm ’s annual report and voluntary disclosure of these 
performance measures in annual reports of other companies to which the firm is related via 
the interlock ties o f the auditor. These findings suggest that the interlock ties o f the external 
auditors matter for provision o f information on financial aspects in annual reports. The 
auditors may use their experience with annual reporting practices in other firms to condition 
or influence the company’s annual reporting practices on financial aspects.
Conclusion and Discussion
This paper investigated the role o f the interlock ties o f executive and supervisory board 
members and external auditors in facilitating cross-firm diffusion of voluntary corporate 
disclosure practices in annual reports. To adequately respond to external expectations and 
pressures, a firm ’s board of directors may need information that advances their knowledge 
about the economic consequences of voluntary performance disclosure and its implications 
for the firm ’s legitimacy. Our theoretical framework suggests that in uncertain and
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competitive environments, organisations are more likely to copy the best annual reporting 
practices of organisations to which they are connected via their board and auditor interlocks. 
Consistent with our general expectations, the results show that firms with board members who 
also sit on the board of directors of other firms had a higher probability o f reporting similar 
financial and non-financial disclosures in their companies’ annual reports. The experience of 
the CEO was relevant for information disclosure about customers, while members of the 
supervisory board, especially the chairman, seemed to promote additional information about 
innovation. The chairman’s experience also mattered for provision of information on internal 
business processes. The interlock ties o f the external auditors increased the likelihood of 
disclosing information on the financial perspective. However, the findings also show that the 
experience of the members o f the supervisory board, excluding its chairman, reduced the 
likelihood of disclosing information on financial aspects. These results suggest that the 
interlock ties of the board members and the auditors provide access to intra-organisational 
information that is important in driving change of corporate disclosure practices. The 
networks o f relationships in which firms were embedded profoundly influenced their 
disclosure of performance measures in the annual reports. As a consequence, the results stress 
the importance o f paying attention to the influence of intra-organisational and interpersonal 
relations as well as corporate characteristics in explaining corporate disclosure practices.
This study has several limitations. Two o f these limitations are the use o f cross­
sectional data from annual reports of a small community which limits the generalisability of 
our findings, and the assumption made in the empirical part of paper that the members o f the 
board of directors uniformly affect the decisions to disclose performance information in the 
annual report. Regarding the latter, the expertise of non-executive board members may 
influence a firm ’s corporate disclosure practices (Hoitash et al., 2009). In addition, powerful 
actors on the board may form dominant coalitions which control the decision-making 
processes at strategic level (Zajac and Westphal, 1996; Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; 
Golden and Zajac, 2001). Consequently, the experience of some members o f the board could 
be more influential than the experience of other interlock partners (Finkelstein, 1992). 
Another limitation of this paper is its focus on the inter-organisational social networks o f the 
board o f directors, ignoring the contributions of other actors via intra-organisational ties on 
the voluntary disclosure o f financial and non-financial measures in corporate reports 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). In addition, staff members and managers at business and 
departmental levels may also influence corporate disclosure practices.
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This study, which was exploratory in nature, leaves ample scope for further research. 
First, future research could test and expand the research model using larger national and 
international samples to provide further insight into the external validity of the findings. In 
addition, this study focused on voluntary disclosure in annual reports. Further research could 
extent this by examining the association between the interlock ties o f the board of directors 
and the external auditors with other forms of voluntary disclosure, such as press releases and 
management forecasts. Second, further studies could look at the extent to which the board 
interlocks of board members with expertise may affect corporate disclosure practices. In 
addition, future research could investigate whether dominant coalitions within the board of 
directors use their power and authority to influence accounting and governance practices. 
Finally, the analysis performed in this study could be complemented with the moderator 
effects of network ties o f other groups of actors which could potentially influence and 
condition the diffusion o f particular annual reporting practices. Increased understanding of the 
roles of both inter-organisational and intra-organisational social networks o f the firm ’s key 
decision-makers may increase insight into the factors that facilitate the cross-firm diffusion of 
corporate disclosure practices.
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Table 1 Sample characteristics
Panel A: Firm characteristics
Industry Number Company size
of firms No of employees Assets per employee
Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Mining and construction 9 24875 37994 274 403
Manufacturing 66 12896 38581 221 223
Transportation and communication 17 16472 39050 4804 11119
Wholesale trade 15 10661 13941 185 220
Retail trade 10 25292 45473 3983 3099
Finance and Insurance 32 11501 39340 260 734
Total 149 14252 37147 962 3923
Panel B: Number of positions of the executive and supervisory board members at own and 
other firms they are associated with
Position in the board of directors Number of board Number of board positions at
positions at own other firms
firm 1 2 3 >4
CEO 156 20 3 2 2
CFO 145 4 0 0 0
Other member of the executive board 284 9 1 0 0
Chairman of the supervisory board 150 21 16 11 0
Other member of the supervisory board 337 74 43 23 3
Total 1072 128 63 36 5
22
Correlation between total scores on disclosure of performance measures and the sub scores on 
the four perspectives, with and without correction for size effects
Table 2
Panel A: Pearson correlation coefficients without correction for size effects
Total Customer Internal
business
Learning 
and growth
Financial
Total 1.000
Customer 731*** 1.000
Internal processes 722*** .374*** 1.000
Learning and growth .846*** 449*** .636*** 1.000
Financial 512*** .201** .035 .266*** 1.000
Panel B: Pearson correlation coefficients with correction for size effects
Total Customer Internal
business
Learning and Financial 
growth
Total 1.000
Customer .688*** 1.000
Internal processes 710*** .323*** 1.000
Learning and growth .830*** .382*** .610*** 1.000
Financial 439*** .101 -.041 .185** 1.000
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two­
tailed), respectively.___________________________________________________________________
Regression results based on the average and maximum experience of the board members and the external 
auditors
Table 3
Panel A: Regression results based on average experience
DCi = p0 + Pi EXPBODAVi + p2 NOBODi + p3 EXPAUDAVi + p4 NOAUDi + p5 LNEMPi (+ p6 LNTAi) 
(+ P7 INDi) + st___________________________________________________________________
Variables Model 1 
Base model
Model 2 
Base model excluding 
industry dummy 
controls
Model 3 
Base model excluding 
industry dummy 
controls plus additional 
size control
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Intercept .127 .083 .095
(1.070) (.795) (0.855)
EXPBODAV .336*** 339*** 345***
(2.633) (2.631) (2.642)
NOBOD .150** 149** .152**
(2.191) (2.173) (2.190)
EXPAUDAV .219 .189 .189
(1.126) (.972) (0.972)
NOAUD .073 .049 .051
(.723) (.493) (0.508)
LNEMP .020*** 019*** .021***
(4.178) (3.909) (2.724)
LNTA -.002
(-0.323)
Industry dummies Included Not included Not included
F-statistic 4.895*** 9.053*** 7.515***
Adj. R2 .240 .214 .209
N 149 149 149
Table 3 (Continued)
Panel B: Regression results based on maximum experience
DCi = Po + Pj EXPBODMAXi + p2 NOBODi + p3 EXPAUDMAXi + p4 NOAUDi + p5 LNEMPi (+ p6 LNTAi) 
(+ P7 INDi) + st______________________________________________________________________
Independent variables Model 1 
Base model
Model 2 
Base model excluding 
industry dummy 
controls
Model 3 
Base model excluding 
industry dummy 
controls plus additional 
size control
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Intercept .162 .128 .142
(1.465) (1.351) (1.389)
EXPBODMAX 279*** .264** **71.2
(2.681) (2.521) (2.540)
NOBOD .129** .122** **52
(2.147) (1.993) (2.018)
EXPAUDMAX .203 .162 .164
(1.070) (.854) (.857)
NOAUD .065 .038 .040
(.660) (.387) (.408)
LNEMP .019*** .018*** .020***
(3.873) (3.650) (2.638)
LNTA -.003
(-.373)
Industry dummies Included Not included Not included
F-statistic 4 939*** 8.935*** 7 424***
Adj. R2 .242 .211 .207
N 149 149 149
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), 
respectively.
Explanation o f the variables
Dependent variable: DC = Disclosure score on the performance measures.
Independent variables: EXPBODAV = Average experience of board members in related firms. EXPBODMAX = 
Maximum experience of board members in related firms. NOBOD = No experience of board members in other 
firms. EXPAUDAV = Average experience of external auditor in related firms. EXPAUDMAX = Maximum 
experience of external auditor in related firms. NOAUD = No experience of external auditor in other firms. 
LNEMP = Natural logarithm of total employees. LNTA = Natural logarithm of total assets. IND = a vector of 
industry dummies based on the Standard Industrial Classification System two-digit code for industry sector. 
Results on the two-digit industry dummies are not reported for parsimony._________________________________
Regression results using the total disclosure scores and the scores in the specific measurement perspectives
Table 4
DCi, j = p0 + pj EXPBODAVi + p2 NOBODi + p3 EXPAUDAVi + p4 NOAUDi + p5 LNEMPi + p6 INDi + et 
with j = Total, Customer, Internal Business, Learning and Growth and Financial_______________________
Independent variables Total disclosure#
score
Disclosure scores in the specific measurement perspectives
Customer Internal
Business
Learning and 
Growth
Financial
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Intercept .127 .096 .203* .065 .211*
(1.070) (.918) (1.703) (.478) (1.754)
EXPBODAV .336*** .271* .070 .379*** .003
(2.633) (1.947) (.557) (2.862) (.363)
NOBOD .150** .097 .016 .202** -.024
(2.191) (1.532) (.248) (2.383) (-.261)
EXPAUDAV .219 -.208 .206 .206 .284**
(1.126) (-.931) (.865) (.945) (2.491)
NOAUD .073 -.035 .007 -.016 .023**
(.723) (-.380) (.062) (-.119) (2.365)
LNEMP .020*** .030*** .014** .021*** .013**
(4.178) (4.159) (2.142) (2.763) (1.990)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included
F-statistic 4.895*** 5.237*** 2.509** 6.611*** 5.376***
Adj. R2 .240 .125 .049 .159 .129
N 149 149 149 149 149
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
Explanation o f the variables
Dependent variables: DC = Disclosure score on the performance measures. The Total disclosure score on the performance 
measures is the average across the disclosure scores on the performance measures in the perspectives Customer, Internal 
Business, Learning and Growth and Financial.
Independent variables: EXPBODAV = Average experience of board members in related firms. NOBOD = No experience 
of board members in other firms. EXPAUDAV = Average experience of external auditor in related firms. NOAUD = No 
experience of external auditor in other firms. LNEMP = Natural logarithm of total employees. IND = a vector of industry 
dummies based on the Standard Industrial Classification System two-digit code for industry sector. Results on the two­
digit industry dummies are not reported for parsimony.
# Findings as in Table 3, panel A, model 1.___________________________________________________________________
Regression results based on the average experience of executive and supervisory board members and the external 
auditors
DCi, j = p0 + p: EXPCEOAVi + p2 EXPCFOAVi + p3 EXPEBOAVi + p4 EXPSBCAVi + ps EXPSBOAVi + p6 NOCEOi + 
p7 NOCFOi + p8 NOEBOi + p9 NOSBCi + p10 NOSBOi + pn EXPAUDAVi + p12 NOAUDi + p13 LNEMPi + p14 INDi + et
Table 5
with j = Total, Customer, Internal Business, Learning and Growth and Financial
Independent variables Total disclosure 
score
Disclosure scores in the specific measurement perspectives
Customer Internal
Business
Learning and 
growth
Financial
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Coef. Estimate 
(t-statistic)
Intercept -.414 -.250 .051 -.457 .118
(-1.345) (-.808) (.109) (-.813) (.297)
EXPCEOAV .293 .416** .210 .093 .000
(1.245) (1.968) (.904) (.418) (.007)
EXPCFOAV .643 .135 .544 .391 .027
(.880) (.079) (.353) (.352) (.876)
EXPEBOAV -.111 .009 -.245 .283 .006
(-.421) (.030) (-.799) (1.146) (.446)
EXPSBCAV .360** .072 .306* .469*** .003
(2.391) (.383) (1.912) (2.955) (.441)
EXPSBOAV .196 .210 -.214 .272* -.020**
(1.359) (1.392) (-1.554) (1.789) (-2.233)
NOCEO .139 .182* -.031 .063 .014
(1.112) (1.875) (-.293) (.443) (.062)
NOCFO .324 .164 .342 .110 .245
(1.151) (.623) (.765) (.194) (.714)
NOEBO -.025 .044 -.108 .223 .106
(-.188) (.374) (-.0799) (1.430) (.650)
NOSBC .170** .026 .138* .244** .010
(2.131) (.324) (1.821) (2.398) (.095)
NOSBO .060 .017 -.115* .127 -.303**
(.778) (.250) (-1.658) (1.337) (-2.412)
EXPAUDAV .144 -.218 .188 .111 .264**
(.743) (-.955) (.773) (.458) (2.249)
NOAUD .029 -.024 .002 -.081 **21
O
(.287) (-.250) (.017) (-.552) (2.031)
LNEMP .018*** 029*** .006 .021*** .017**
(3.439) (3.658) (.830) (2.595) (2.372)
Industry dummies Included Included Included Included Included
F-statistic 4 375*** 2.668*** 2 443*** 3.190*** 2.950***
Adj. R2 .229 .128 .112 .161 .146
N 149 149 149 149 149
***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
Explanation o f the variables
Dependent variables: DC = Disclosure score on the performance measures. The Total disclosure score on the performance 
measures is the average across the disclosure scores on the performance measures in the perspectives Customer, Internal 
Business, Learning and Growth and Financial.
Independent variables: EXPCEOAV = Average experience of the CEO in related firms. EXPCFOAV = Average 
experience of the CFO in related firms. EXPEBOAV = Average experience of other executive board members in related 
firms. EXPSBCAV = Average experience of the chairman of supervisory board in related firms. EXPSBOAV = Average 
experience of the other supervisory board members in related firms. NOCEO = No experience of the CEO in other firms. 
NOCFO = No experience of the CFO in other firms. NOEBO = No experience of the other executive board members in 
other firms. NOSBC = No experience of the chairman of supervisory board in other firms. NOSBO = No experience of
other supervisory board members in other firms. EXPAUDAV = Average experience of external auditor in related firms. 
NOAUD = No experience of external auditor in other firms. LNEMP = Natural logarithm of total employees. IND = a 
vector of industry dummies based on the Standard Industrial Classification System two-digit code for industry sector. 
Results on the two-digit industry dummies are not reported for parsimony._______________________________________
Appendix A Overview of performance measurement items
Customer perspective
1 Market share
2 Turnover segmentation to market segments
3 Market share growth related to sales growth
4 Marketing activities
5 Sales growth related to marketing activities
6 Corporate image or reputation
7 New customers or clients acquired
8 Customer satisfaction
9 Customer retention
10 Number of customer complaints
11 Average customer size
12 After-sales service and support
13 Warranty repair cost
14 Service/product quality
15 Number of orders or contracts acquired
16 On-time delivery
17 Percentage shipment returned due to poor quality
Internal business perspective
1 Order-delivery time
2 Time from order to delivery
3 Manufacturing lead time
4 Labour efficiency variance
5 Material efficiency variance
6 Ratio of good output to total output
7 Stock-out %
8 Cost reduction of operational processes
9 Efficiency of logistics
10 Percentage defective products shipped
11 Use of quality control systems (like TQM)
12 Safety requirements
Learning and growth perspective
1 Investment in research and development
2 Introduction of new products or services
3 Number of new patents or licenses
4 Time to market of new products
5 Investment in new market development
6 Investment in new technology development
7 Qualified leadership programs
8 Retention of top employees
9 Competency management
10 Employee satisfaction
11 Sickness and absence policy
12 Average employee tenure
13 Employee growth
14 Employee segmentation
15 Employee skills training programs
16 Employee remuneration policy
17 Employee suggestions and new ideas
18 Use of interactive control systems
19 Use of knowledge-sharing systems
Financial perspective
1 Sales growth
2 Return on sales
3 Assets turnover
4 Return on equity (ROE)
5 EBIT(DA)
6 Return on total assets (ROTA)
7 Return on capital employed (ROCE)
8 Gearing ratio
9 Solvency ratio
10 Interest cover
11 Tax growth or decline
12 Earnings per share
13 Price earnings ratio
14 Pay-out ratio
15 Dividend yield
16 Shareholders’ equity per share
17 Market capitalisation
18 Development of shares
19 Remuneration to the board of directors
20 Profit per employee
